Terrorism and Nation-State institutions: Actions and Inter-actions

Globalization refers in general to the worldwide integration of humanity and the compression of both the temporal and spatial dimensions of planet wide human interaction[1].” It brought unprecedented change to the life of people, society and countries. While globalization has brought an unprecedented development and progress to people, tagging alongside is also its negative face, because it also facilitated international terrorism[2] and other form of trans-national crimes. Trans-national terrorism is a global phenomenon, which is seen as one of the most destructive. The 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States of America illustrates the lethality of the new threat. Some argues that the nature of the threat render national security institutions inadequate to respond to the threat[3]. Hence, countries were seen responding in various ways.

This article seeks to understand why nation-state institutions’ behaviour has to change to effectively respond to the new threat of trans-national terrorism? It is anchored on the thesis that nation-state institutions, such as but not limited to military and police is not adequately designed to response to this new threat to national security. The nature of the threat, its peculiar operational methodology and varying context and environment renders the conventional warfare-weighted national security framework irresponsive in addressing the threat of trans-national terrorism. This is explained in different ways.

Nature of threat

Firstly, the new threat nature of violence is very destructive, and does not discriminate targets both military and non-military. It wanted attention and wish to inflict mass casualties. Al-qaeda led by Osama Bin Laden, is built around loosely linked cells that do not rely on a single leader or state sponsor[4]. Hence, strategic leadership targeting cannot be easily done, though it is responsible for the most lethal terrorist attack in history and achieved the highest rate of lethality per attack.[5] Al-qaeda had succeeded in attacking US symbols of economic and political power in September 11 2001 (Twin Towers, Pentagon), and despite the military capability of the United States, it failed to effectively and immediately respond. Among reasons United State military apparatus, which is designed primarily either to engage in expansionistic excursions or at least to be ready to deal with ever-possible military incursions of other states[6] is not prepare to deal with non-state actors, an enemy, which has no strategic depth, which one can identify boundaries, battlefronts and strategic leadership.

Second, the new threat of terrorism is both trans-national and non-state actors, which operates globally. For Al-Qaeda and the Jemaah Islamiyah, although some denied links to it, report suggests that it has successfully managed to co-opt local ethno-nationalist Liberation Fronts, such as the Secessionist movement in Southern Philippines, Thailand, Chechnya, Iraq and Afghanistan. Its operators are trans-national, non-state actors who hold allegiance to a cause, not a state. This is problematic because the traditional forms of state interactions—diplomatic, economic, and military—to solve differences prior to conflict are difficult to apply in a non-state actor context. When things get testy, whom do you negotiate with, whom do you sanction, and who do you threatened with force? If trans-national, non-state actor like Bin laden uses a weapon of Mass destruction against a state, whom the state has to retaliate with?

Operational Methodology

Thirdly, the terrorist threat is either self reliant or innovatively used with ease international financial system and technology to transfer funds. Terrorist have income streams from legal and illegal sources and are not accountable to state sponsors—or anyone else. Al Qaeda is a wealthy, multi-national organization with numerous income streams. It has investment and concealed accounts worldwide, many in the Western societies Bin Laden most despises[7]. A case in point is the terrorist operations in the Philippines wherein Al-Qaeda believed to have channeled funds through an International Islamic Relief Organization, a legally registered charity institutions led by Osama Bin Laden brother-in-law, Mohamad Jamal Khalifa to fund terrorist bombing activities in the Philippines, such as Rizal day Bombing in Manila. Currently, this charity institution’s financial assets were frozen by the  Philippine Anti-Money Laundering Council. The legal framework provided by State democratic institutions facilitated terrorist operations, which Nation State institutions has very little control.

Fourthly, new terrorist threat is better trained in the arts of war. From the materials captured in Al-Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan and from similar training materials of other Muslim extremist groups found in Europe and Central Asia. Al Qaeda operatives are well trained in military, special operations and intelligence functions. They drew an on going grass root support and a fanatical willingness to fight to death, “making it a daunting foe[8]. With this sophistication, it requires a small highly deployable military force. While US has special forces to confront irregular fighter such as this threat, these forces are not available in large quantities[9].

Threat Environment

Fifth, the new terrorist threat, particularly the religious extremists are more difficult to penetrate because of the level of fraternization involved. A case in point is the networked, cellular structure used by Al-Qaeda and its allies which is particularly difficult to penetrate, especially for a hierarchical security apparatus of conventional security forces inherent in the nation-state institutions, such as the United States. The Al-Qaeda model, which is composed of many cells whose members do not know one another used strict communications discipline, is more than a match for western intelligence agencies that rely mainly on technical means of collection[10]. The new threat can’t be bought, bribed, or even blackmailed.

Implications to Nation States Institutions

The Trans-national Terrorist threat immediate impact to nation-state institutions can be categorized into four elements; inadequacy of Military and Police Solutions, need for inter-agency coordination, the need for private Sector, Civil Society and Non-government Organizations cooperation and the need for international Cooperation.

Inadequacy of Military and Police Solutions

Firstly, military and police solution is not adequate to address the problem. The military apparatus of most nations-state is designed not to address this new threat. This is evidenced by the events of September 11, which the United States and its allies clarified the urgent need to refocus and re-structure the way it thinks about its plan for military campaign. The Western armed forces are fundamentally flawed, because conceptually, the focus is still on conventional warfare, but the new war on terror is unconventional[11].

Due to the nature of violence, which primarily targets civilian and civilian infrastructure, it renders the human resources capability of the military and police impossible to secure all government facilities and critical infrastructures. Hence, the needs to employ the help of private sector to fill-in this gap. In this case where, private security agencies filled-in the gap. The Blackwater Private Military Contractor Company in Iraq is an example.

Inter-agency coordination

Secondly, there is need for an Inter-agency coordination and the whole-of-government approach in effectively responding to the threat. The indiscriminate nature of violence that the new terrorist is capable of doing requires different counter-strategy. This strategy requires different set of actions that requires different set of actors, which could not be confined to particular government institution. For instance, the 9/11 terrorist attack immediate implications to US government is the creations of the Homeland Security Department and the National Security Agency. DHS has built an integrated emergency response workforce—with FEMA, Coast Guard, Federal Air Marshals, Immigration & Customs Enforcement, and Secret Service developing emergency response strike teams[12]. The idea of establishing the new mechanisms is to ensure high level of coordination among agencies from prevention to consequence management in case of a threat or actual terrorist attack. The National Security Agency provides mechanisms of high level of coordination between the FBI and the CIA. Other countries, such as Singapore Philippines, Australia and UK have created similar mechanisms of coordination among agencies of government. The new threat of terrorism requires high level of coordination from strategic, operational and community level of government to effectively respond to it.

Private Sector, Civil Society and Non-government Organization (NGO)

Thirdly, there is a need for NGO, civil society and religious sector cooperation. The new threat is a trans-national insurgency soluble in the smallest unit of the nation-state system—the village or community. For instance, the London bombers are home grown terrorist motivated by their marginalization in the western society, Al-Qaeda is motivated by the failure of nation-state system in the Middle East. Others, such as those in Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand and Indonesia are motivated by poverty, political and civil rights, among others. Their common bond is their common ideological agenda. Hence, it requires an ideological response. In this nature of the threat, government institution alone cannot solely address the issue, but one that would require the participation of NGOs, which are institutions outside of the government structure. US significantly invested in dialogue with the Islamic World. Singapore for instance, emerged to be one of the pioneers in successfully establishing the religious rehabilitation group (RRG) for terrorist detainees and in engaging its Muslim constituencies. This infusion of new institutional arrangement in the national security paradigm is brought by the threat of terrorism.

International Cooperation

Fourthly, there is a need for an international cooperation to effectively respond to the new threat of terrorism. The age of Globalization characterized by permissive government system especially the Western societies, global communications and easy travel facilitated the formation of global network of terrorist[13]. As a case in point, the Islamist inspired terrorist has been allowed to move from one Islamic country, where they have traditionally assimilated and found employment, to the long established Islamic Diasporas in other countries where they can network through religious and social systems. Al Qaeda for example has inspired groups such as Abusayaf in the Philippines and Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia to become franchises by sharing resources, information, people, and ideology[14]. This threat capability to coop local terrorist (home grown) and shifts operations along cross borders requires a focus and coordinated response from state to state. This involves creating a mechanism wherein nation-states institutions will be provided mechanisms of cooperation. The current global coalition of the war against terror, seen in Iraq and Afghanistan and the cross border patrol agreements among Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines are few of the examples of the need to draw inter-state coordinative infrastructure to address this threat.

Conclusion

What the discussions had tell us all along, supports the argument that nation state institution behaviour changes because the design and apparatus of these institutions are not adequate to meet responsibly the requirements of the threat of Trans-national terrorism. The United States military apparatus as any other country in the post cold war era is designed for conventional warfare projected to meet state actors, but the new threat is a non-state actors. For instance, Al-Qaeda rarely engaged in military adventurism, its nature of warfare is indiscriminate attacking of civilian targets to pressure state security infrastructure to a defensive posture. Its organizational and operational methodology is flexible and networked and has no strategic depth that renders conventional military structure irresponsive.

The terrorist also is motivated by varying set of conditions from poverty to marginalization, linked only by common ideology. Hence, it requires an approach that requires the whole of government mechanisms, including the non-government organization and the private sector.

The whole-of-government approach and the change it entails to both structure and conduct of government, support the notion that State as a living organism changes its behaviour to preserve itself if threatened. It supports the realist theory of “balance of power”, which explains nation-states tendency to project power and shaped its power structure according to its ability to preserve itself and eradicate its perceived adversaries.

It is too early to assess the effectiveness of the changes made to nation-state’s institutions in responding to the threat. Some early indications are the formation of taskforces, national security committees and councils to effect the new institutional arrangements. In conclusion, the nature of trans-national terrorism, a dimension of globalization significantly altered the nation-state institutional arrangements and national security strategies. If a new threat evolved, so does nation-state security infrastructure.

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[1] Richard L. Harris, “The Global Context of Contemporary Latin American Affairs,” in Capital, Power, and Inequality in Latin America, eds., Sandor Halebsky and Richard L. Harris (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 279, 80[2] Cronin, Audrey K “Behind the curve, Globalization and international terrorism, cited in Defeating Terrorism by Howard , et.al, (, USA : McGraw Hill, 2002), p29[3]Rob de Wijk, “The Limits of Military Power”, cited in Howard and etal,” Defeating Terrorism”, (USA: McGraw-Hill, 2002), p 482[4] Brian Murphy, “The shape of terrorism,” Fayetteville Observer, Aug 21,2002, p.94

[5] Bruce Newcome, “Executive Summary,” Mass casualty Terrorism: Second Quarterly Forecast, http://www.rdg.ac.uk/GSEIS/University_of_Reading_Terrorism-Forecast_2003Q2.pdf

[6] John Keegan, a History of Warfare(New York:Knorpf, 1993.)

[7] Brian Murphy.

[8] Ann Tyson, “Al Qaeda, resilient and Organized, “Chriostian Science Monitor, Mar 7, 2002, p1

[9] Wijk Rob de, “the limits of military power cited in Howard, et al “terrorism and counter terrorism” (USA: Mcgraw Hills, 2002) p 483.

[10] Rohan Gunratna, “Inside Al-Qaedah:Global Network of Terror(New York:Columbia University Press, 2002)p.76.

[11] Rob de Wijk, “The Limits of Military Power”, cited in Howard and etal,” Defeating Terrorism”, (USA: Mcgraw-Hill, 2002), p 482

[12]Department of Homeland Security”, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/gc_1172594004145.shtm, accessed 27 January 2008,

[13] Downing, Wayne, “ Global War on Terrorism”, cited by Sawyer, and et’al “Defeating terrorism”, (USA: Mcgrawhill, 2002).p 151

[14] Gunaratna, Inside Alqaeda,

BASILAN OFFENSIVE: LIMITED POLICE ACTION OR ALL-OUT WAR IN DISGUISE?

Press Release

“Limited police action”, that is how the hawks in government and military describes the impending offensive in Basilan to assure the people that it will not lead to another all-out war. We have heard this phrase before.

In year 2000, this was also the phrase used in the aftermath of the Ozamiz ferry bombing. In year 2003, it was again used in the aftermath of the Davao city airport and wharf bombings. And from what transpired in those years, we all know the truth behind that phrase – ALL OUT WAR! Read more

Cong. Jikiri is the New Peace Committee Chair

Press Release
Office of Cong. Yusop Jikiri
congjikiri@yahoo.com

QUEZON CITY – The Special Committee on Peace, Unity and Reconciliation of the 14th Congress elects Congressman Yusop Jikiri of the 1st District of Sulu as its new Chairman.

Created in 2004, the Peace Committee has 26 regular members. It conducts inquiries on the implementation of the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement as well as the ongoing GRP and MILF, and GRP and CPP-NDF peace negotiations. As a result of its previous briefings, the committee has provided recommendations on the prevailing issues as bases of further policies. Read more

MNLF – GRP Clash in Sulu

Of course, we all remember the now infamous clash between the MILF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines on July 10, 2007. Some 14 to 23 Philippine Marines were killed in the encounter and of those, 10 were later beheaded by Abu Sayyaf bandits who raided the battlefield after hostilities ceased. Now, an encounter between the MNLF and AFP has resulted in the deaths of 27 people, 26 of whom were Philippine Soldiers. In addition to the soldiers, an innocent and unarmed boy was killed in the clash.

The Philippine Government is saying that the rebels involved in the attack were a combination of Abu Sayyaf and MNLF. According to Government sources, the MNLF has admitted having a hand in the battle. Read more

Yellow Bus Lines suspends GenSan-Davao-Koronadal route following bombings

General Santos City (7 August) — The management of Koronadal-based Yellow Bus Lines (YBL) has announced its temporarily bringing to a halt all its GenSan-Davao-Koronadal route schedules starting Monday following the bombing incidents late Friday afternoon last week.

The placing of all YBL units on “stand by” has greatly affected businesses and commuters here since YBL dominates the GenSan-Davao-Koronadal route with close to 150 buses operating daily.

Last Friday afternoon, a twin-explosion hit YBL Terminal in Koronadal City, South Cotabato killing a church leader and wounding six others. Read more